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Closer Than “Arms Length”: Understanding the Factors Associated with Collaborative
Contracting
Anna A. Amirkhanyan
Hyun Joon Kim
Kristina Lambright
This article focuses on collaborative relationships between contractors and government agencies
and explores which contract characteristics, contractor traits, and environmental factors are
associated with the development of such relationships. The study uses data from the Partnership
Impact Research Project, a three-round longitudinal survey of over one hundred child care
centers and Head Start agencies in Ohio. Our findings suggest that stronger collaborative
contracting relationships are associated with greater contract specificity, better contractor service
quality, and contractor affiliation with a larger organization. On the other hand, a contractor’s
financial autonomy and nonprofit status are negatively related to collaborative relationship
strength. We also find that a contractor’s internal management capacity is positively associated
with the development of shared procedures governing contractual relationships.
Introduction
Holding contractors accountable for the services they deliver is a key challenge facing
public managers involved in overseeing federal, state, and local contracts with nonprofit and forprofit organizations (Blasi, 2002; Breaux, Duncan, & Keller, 2002; Coats, 2002; Dicke, 2002;
Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Klingner, Nalbandian, & Romzek, 2002; Ott & Dicke, 2000;
Romzek & Johnston, 2005). Public managers use a variety of different strategies while designing
their relationships with contractors in an effort to ensure that services meet the government’s
expectations and to minimize the likelihood of contractors’ behaving opportunistically. One such
strategy involves fostering strong, collaborative relationships with private partners (Beinecke &
DeFillippi, 1999; DeHoog, 1990; Sclar, 2000). Indicative of this, there is a growing recognition
of trust and cooperation playing a key role in many public contracts (Beinecke & DeFillippi,
1999; DeHoog, 1990; Johnston & Romzek, 2008; Lambright, 2009; Romzek & Johnston, 2005;
Smith, 1996: Van Slyke, 2007). In the contracting literature, these types of contracts are often
referred to as “relational.”
As governments continue to rely on nonprofit and for-profit organizations in the delivery
of public services, concerns about public managers’ capacity to effectively monitor performance
still persist, and the “black box” of accountability mechanisms designed to ensure effective
implementation of public services needs to be better understood. In particular, little is known
about the determinants of collaborative contract governance. Scholars have detailed the service
characteristics that are likely to be associated with the adoption of collaborative contractual
arrangements (Amirkhanyan, 2009; Beinecke & DeFillippi, 1999; Kim, 2005; Sclar, 2000).
However, less evidence is available on the organizational and environmental factors that facilitate the development of these types of contracting relationships (Van Slyke, 2009). By focusing

on one service area, this article looks beyond service characteristics as explanations for collaborative contractual arrangements. Instead, we focus on contract characteristics, contractor traits,
and environmental factors and provide insights into how these variables are related to the
development of strong collaborative relationships between the contractor and government. As a
part of our analysis, we examine an important debate in the contracting literature and empirically
test whether an inverse or complementary relationship exists between collaboration and the
degree of contract specification.
The data for this study are from the Partnership Impact Research Project, a three-round
longitudinal survey of more than 100 child care centers and Head Start agencies in Ohio. This
service area is particularly well-suited for the research questions examined in this study. First, the
lack of competition in the social service field often translates into long-term relationships forming
between government agencies and their contractors (Johnston & Romzek, 2008; Lambright, 2009;
Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Smith, 1996; Smith & Smyth, 1996). Second, in comparison to the socalled “hard” services, such as construction, maintenance, or waste removal, outcomes in the social
services field are harder to measure. This commonly precludes government agencies from
specifying all of their expectations in advance of contract implementation and forces them to rely
on cooperation and trust instead.
We begin this article by discussing contract relationships as a means for minimizing
opportunistic behavior of contractors. We identify several contract characteristics, contractor
traits, and environmental factors that may be associated with the development of strong
collaborative relationships between the government and the contractor. Following this, we detail
our methodology and findings. This article concludes by exploring the theoretical and practical
implications of our study for public managers pursuing collaborative approaches to contracting.
Strategies for Minimizing Contractor Opportunism
Situations in which a government agency contracts with another organization to deliver a
public good or service are often conceptualized as a principal-agent relationship. In contracting
relationships, the contractor, viewed as an “agent,” typically has more information about
operations and its own capacities than the government, who is the “principal.” This situation is
fertile ground for opportunism, a concept central to transaction cost economics (Williamson,
1975). Defined by Williamson as “a lack of candor or honesty in transaction, to include selfinterest with guile” (1975, p. 9), opportunistic behavior by contractors creates two key problems
in principal-agent relationships: adverse selection and moral hazard. The former is a concern at
the onset of contracting relationships and is what Arrow (1984) refers to as “hidden
information.” It involves an agent’s propensity to misrepresent its ability to meet its contractual
obligations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Van Slyke, 2007). Moral hazard, on the other hand, is a concern
during contract implementation and is what Arrow (1984) refers to as “hidden action.” Moral
hazard occurs when an agent exploits its informational advantage over the principal and does not
fulfill its contractual responsibilities (Eisenhardt, 1989; Sclar, 2000; Van Slyke, 2007).
Governments are more vulnerable to contractors behaving opportunistically when the services
being contracted have a high level of asset-specificity1 and it is difficult to measure the quality
and/or quantity of services being delivered (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 2006).
One response to the possibility of opportunistic behavior by contractors involves
carefully detailing the terms and the procedures governing service delivery (Beinecke &
DeFillippi, 1999; Brown et al., 2006; Sclar, 2000). However, the nature of some services and the
administrative costs often make complete contract specification challenging (Milgrom &

Roberts, 1992; Tirole, 1999). Besides, creating elaborate contracts without at the same time
fostering trust may simply motivate individuals to come up with creative ways to game the
system and avoid fulfilling their contractual obligations (Granovetter, 1985).
An alternative strategy designed to minimize the possibility of contractor opportunism is
for the government to focus on developing strong relationships by building trust and pursuing
cooperative approaches to contract management problems (Beinecke & DeFillippi, 1999;
DeHoog, 1990; Sclar, 2000). As Arrow points out, “It saves a lot of trouble to have a fair degree
of reliance in other people’s word (1974, p. 23).” Inter- and intraorganizational behavior theorists
argue that transaction cost economics largely overstate the role of self-interested or rationally
controlled behavior (Ghoshal & Insead, 1996). Organizations are not markets and often benefit
more from cultivating shared purposes rather than by behaving opportunistically. Thus
organizations use social control—informal strategies to create commitment and to motivate
participants through integration of norms and by internalizing each other’s values (Ghoshal &
Insead, 1996).
Rather than having a principal and an agent, the government and the contractor in these
trust-based contracting relationships are conceptualized as equal partners involved in program
management as well as contract renewal (DeHoog, 1990). The contracting parties are willing to
make short-term sacrifices for the partnership because they recognize that it is in their long-term
interest to sustain the relationship (Smith, 1996). There is considerable decentralization and
flexibility in trust-based models of contracting. The government provides contractors with a
great deal of discretion and in many cases defers to the contractor’s expertise (Campbell &
Harris, 1993; DeHoog, 1990), relying on common professional standards to limit opportunistic
behavior (Bennett & Ferlie, 1996; DeHoog, 1990). Trust-based models of contracting have been
used in a broad array of service areas including infectious disease management (Allen et al.,
2002), Medicaid managed care (Beinecke & DeFillipi, 1999), HIV/AIDS services (Bennett &
Ferlie, 1996), foster care services (Klingner et al., 2002), early childhood programs (Lambright,
2009), social services (Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Smith, 1996), and human waste collection
(Kim, 2005).
This article takes a broad approach to the “relational” aspects of contracting. Based on
the reviewed literature, strong collaborative relationships between contractors and government
agencies involve the following elements: (a) a shared understanding of the programmatic mission, goals, and objectives; (b) coordinated and shared operational and administrative processes;
(c) a high level of formal and informal communication; and (d) mutual trust, respect, and cooperation. A system where these aspects are present is likely to provide “social controls” (Ghoshal &
Insead, 1996), which may guide organizational behavior.

Factors Influencing Collaborative Relationship Strength
The adoption of collaborative contract management strategies in the field of social
services is not well understood. In this section, we develop several hypotheses on a variety of
factors likely to be associated with the development of strong collaborative relationships between
the government and the contractor. We group these factors into the broader categories of contract
characteristics, contractor traits, and environmental conditions.
Contract specificity. To effectively manage contracts, the government must maintain a
careful balance between trust and hands-on monitoring (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002).
Opportunism may still be present in strong relationships, particularly in situations where there is

a significant informational asymmetry between the government and contractor (DeHoog, 1990;
Entwistle & Martin, 2005). In addition, collaborative relationships can foster a sense of
complacency (DeHoog, 1990) and may stifle innovation if partners are unwilling to critique each
other for fear of damaging their relationship (Entwistle & Martin, 2005). Therefore, agencies
may choose to raise the costs of opportunistic behavior by specifying expectations and defining
the associated rewards and sanctions.
In the past, contracts have been conceptualized as lying on a continuum between transactional contracting at one end and relational contracting at the other end (Beinecke &
DeFillippi, 1999; MacNeil, 1974). Transactional contracts are short-term, economic exchanges
based on carefully detailed contractual agreements and close oversight of the provider’s compliance. In contrast, relational contracts are based on open-ended, long-term exchanges in which
personal ties and informal communication foster trust and flexible approaches to solving
implementation problems. Consistent with this perspective, some scholars have argued that trust
and contract specification have an inverse relationship: as trust increases, the need for formal
contract specification decreases (Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Van Slyke, 2009). By
carefully detailing contractual terms and the procedures governing the contracting relationship,
the government is signaling a lack of trust in the contractor (Van Slyke, 2009). Moreover, the
initial investments in formal controls may deter the government from incurring additional
transaction costs associated with frequent communication and the development of shared goals
and procedures.
Hypothesis 1a: Contract specification is negatively associated with collaborative relationship
strength.
In contrast to the argument presented above, other scholars have argued that trust and contract
specification play complementary roles (Allen et al., 2002; Deakin, Lane, & Wilkinson, 1994).
Working together as part of the contract specification process may build trust (Allen et al., 2002).
Contract specification may strengthen the collaborative relationship between the government and
the contractor by reducing government concerns that the contractor will behave opportunistically
and by reducing contractor concerns that the government will arbitrarily exercise its authority. It
may also foster a shared understanding of processes and procedures since contractors have a
chance to provide feedback and request clarifications on the government’s expectations
(Amirkhanyan, 2009). Hence, formal relationships may serve as the foundation for the government
and contractor developing stronger informal relationships. The presence of trust and contract
specificity in contracting relationships may combine to create both “a carrot and a stick”; the
existence of written procedures and sanctions ensures that the basic parameters of the contract are
taken seriously, while collaborative ties and discussions may ensure that these procedures are well
understood and well received.
Hypothesis 1b: Contract specification is positively associated with collaborative relationship
strength.2
Relationship length. Another contract characteristic that may be associated with a
collaborative approach to contracting is relationship length. Trust between parties is a learning
process (Lorenz, 1999; Vangen & Huxham, 2003) and tends to develop over time (Thomson &
Perry, 2006; Van Slyke, 2007, 2009). Reflecting this, government officials may be more likely to

adopt a cooperative model of contracting after several years of having a satisfactory but more
formal relationship with a particular contractor (DeHoog, 1990). Given this, we suggest that longer
contracting partnerships will result in stronger collaborative relationships compared to shorter
partnerships, keeping constant the contractor’s performance during this period. Longer contractual
relationships allow the parties to develop some familiarity with each other, promoting more
frequent and informal communication, and a better understanding of each others’ organizational
cultures. Longer ties also suggest parties believe that they are benefiting in some way from the
sustained collaborative relationships which may prevent contractors from behaving
opportunistically.
Hypothesis 2: Relationship length is positively associated with collaborative relationship
strength.
Internal management capacity. Contractor traits are also likely to play a role in the
development of strong collaborative relationships between the government and the contractor.
Contractors must have enough time, staff, and expertise to implement contracts (DeHoog, 1990).
Some contractors have skilled managers who invest their time and energy in improving the internal
processes and optimizing service quality while other contractors lack such expertise. One might
expect that the most skilled managers are often those who can manage not only “within” but also
“across” organizations—building lateral communication channels, adjusting organizational
structures, and creating common procedures facilitating program implementation. Stronger
managers also understand the value of leadership and spend more time articulating the goals,
framing the issues, motivating the participants and developing shared understandings with their
partners that are essential for effective service implementation (Goerdel, 2006). Based on this, a
contractor’s capacity to effectively manage internal relationships may translate into the capacity
to manage external relationships as well.
Hypothesis 3a: A contractor’s internal management capacity is positively associated with
collaborative relationship strength.
It is also possible that when a contractor devotes considerable effort to internal management,
the contractor will have less time and resources available to manage external relationships. As a
result, collaborative relationship strength may actually decrease as internal management capacity
increases.
Hypothesis 3b: A contractor’s internal management capacity is negatively associated with
collaborative relationship strength.
Contractor ownership status. Other contractor traits that may be associated with the
development of collaborative contracting relationships include a contractor’s status as a nonprofit
or faith-based organization. Public managers may perceive nonprofit contractors as more
trustworthy than for-profit contractors because nonprofits are required to invest any profits back
into their organizations and cannot distribute excess revenues to their shareholders (Hansman,
1987). Thus nonprofit organizations may be less likely to take advantage of clients by raising
prices or cutting costs in situations where competition is limited and service quality is hard to

verify such as in the field of social services. Nonprofit managers are also constrained by the
“reasonable compensation” requirement, which may result in the government viewing its nonprofit
partners as being more mission-oriented, socially conscious, and hence less opportunistic. The
high cost of opportunistic behavior that can jeopardize private donations and their tax exempt
status may further deter nonprofit organizations from not fulfilling their commitments. Consistent
with this, Van Slyke (2009) reports that public managers were initially more trusting of nonprofit
service providers compared to for-profit service providers, and Amirkhanyan (2009) finds
nonprofit contractors were more likely to collaborate with government agencies on performance
measurement activities. Government agencies may also be more likely to trust faith-based
organizations compared to their secular counterparts because of faith-based organizations’
emphasis on religious values. One might expect that government agencies will have stronger
collaborative relationships with nonprofit and faith-based contractors due to the fact government
agencies may be more likely to trust these contractors.
Hypothesis 4a: A contractor’s status as a nonprofit organization is positively associated with
collaborative relationship strength.
Hypothesis 5a: A contractor’s status as a faith-based organization is positively associated with
collaborative relationship strength.
On the other hand, a contractor’s status as a nonprofit organization or as a faith-based
organization may make it more difficult to develop strong collaborative relationships with the
government. While the virtues of nonprofit organizations are widely recognized, some
researchers point out their many pitfalls. In the absence of financial incentives to guide
organizational leadership, nonprofit organization may be poorly managed (Hansmann,1986;
Prager, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1986). In addition, numerous accountability pressures can result
in dysfunctional managerial behavior (Johnston & Romzek, 1999). Despite the assumptions of
the socially responsible nature of nonprofit organizations, they may prioritize different service
delivery norms than public organizations: while governments may emphasize equal access to
services, nonprofits may prioritize responsiveness to more limited community groups
(Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008; Smith & Lipsky, 1993). Government may be less
likely to trust nonprofits based on these considerations. It may also be challenging for faith-based
organizations to effectively collaborate with government agencies because of their strong
emphasis on religious values. The legal constraints imposed by the government agencies on the
way in which public dollars may be spent within a faith-based organization (e.g., the restriction
on proselytizing while delivering public programs) can complicate interorganizational ties and
discourage a nonprofit from being fully transparent. Thus, if the religious values of a faith-based
organization are not fully consistent with the government’s goals, the relationship between the
faith-based organization and the government may suffer.
Hypothesis 4b: A contractor’s status as a nonprofit organization is negatively associated with
collaborative relationship strength.
Hypothesis 5b: A contractor’s status as a faith-based organization is negatively associated
with collaborative relationship strength.
Contractor service quality. Trust results in a relationship when the parties involved have a
history of successfully completed transactions (Lambright, Mischen, & Laramee, 2010; Lorenz,
1999; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Van Slyke, 2007). Poor or

unremarkable performance may naturally be associated with shorter contracts, but in some
markets it may not be possible to impose the ultimate sanction—contract termination—for a
variety of reasons including lack of contractor competition, lack of funding for service
improvement, or poor performance measurement mechanisms. In cases where contract
termination is not an option, one may expect the government to be less likely to develop strong
informal ties with contractors who have not met the government’s service delivery goals. On the
other hand, government agencies may be interested in maintaining closer relationships with high
performers to sustain good program outcomes and perhaps to collect information on their best
practices for dissemination to other contractors. Contractors delivering high quality services may
also seek stronger collaborative relationships with the government in an effort to highlight the
superior quality of their services compared to other service providers. Hence, we expect there to
be a positive association between contractor service quality and collaborative relationship
strength.
Hypothesis 6: Contractor service quality is positively associated with collaborative relationship strength.
Contractor size. A final contractor characteristic that may be associated with the adoption of a
more collaborative approach to contract management is organizational size. Bigger contractors
may benefit from economies of scale and have more institutional capacity to be collaborative with
government agencies.
Hypothesis 7a: Contractor size is positively associated with collaborative relationship strength.
It is also possible that contractor size will be negatively related to collaborative relationship
strength. Organizations often collaborate to obtain the resources needed to achieve their goals
(Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Fleishman, 2009; Whetten & Leung, 1979). Smaller contractors
are likely to be less financially secure and more reliant on their contracts. Therefore, they may
work harder on building collaborative relationships with government agencies. Smaller contractors
are also less likely to have formally written, institutionalized procedures pertaining to
communication, and hence these organizations may use a more informal communication style.
Hypothesis 7b: Contractor size is negatively associated with collaborative relationship strength.
Financial autonomy from the contracting government agency. In addition to contract
characteristics and contractor traits, a contractor’s external ties to their environment are likely to
be associated with the development of collaborative contractual arrangements. Like smaller
organizations, organizations that receive substantial funding from other government sources are
likely to be less dependent on their contract as a critical revenue source and may be willing to
invest less time and effort into their relationships with the government to ensure they are
successful. As a result, we expect that these types of organizations will have weaker collaborative
relationships with the contracting government agency. Consistent with this prediction,
Amirkhanyan (2009) finds that contractors that were less financially dependent on their contracts
were less likely to collaborate with government agencies in the process of performance monitoring.

Hypothesis 8: Financial autonomy from the contracting government agency is negatively
associated with collaborative relationship strength.
Affiliation with a larger organization. Another environmental factor that may be
associated with collaborative relationship strength is a contractor’s affiliation with a larger
organization. The government agency may be more likely to presume that the contractors
affiliated with larger organizations have the capacity to deliver high quality services because of
the benefits they receive from economies of scale. As a result of this confidence, governments
may be more willing to make investments in their relationships with these contractors. In
addition, contractors that already have ties with a parent institution may have more institutional
capacity to be collaborative and hence may be able to work more effectively in partnership with
the contracting public agency.
Hypothesis 9a: Contractor affiliation with a larger organization is positively associated with
collaborative relationship strength.
It is also possible that contractors not affiliated with larger organizations will have stronger
collaborative relationships with government agencies. These contractors may be less financially
secure and more reliant on their contracts. As a result, unaffiliated contractors may have more
incentive to invest time and energy in their relationships with government agencies.
Hypothesis 9b: Contractor affiliation with a larger organization is negatively associated with
collaborative relationship strength.
Influence of client groups. Finally, the presence of influential client groups may be associated
with the development of weaker collaborative relationships between the contractor and
government. Powerful client groups can serve as another mechanism for monitoring the services
that contractors deliver. Brown and Potoski (2006) find that the government may adjust the extent
of its monitoring in cases when the contractor is also monitored and evaluated by a third party.
Client groups can pressure contractors to improve service quality and be responsive to their needs.
Hence, the government agency may be able to reduce the extent of its own monitoring. Under such
conditions, the communication between the government and the contractor will also be minimized
and that, in turn, can hinder the development of trust-based relationships (Bohnet & Huck, 2003;
Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Gulati, 1995; Lambright et al., 2010).
Hypothesis 10: The influence of client groups is negatively associated with collaborative
relationship strength.
Method
To examine the factors associated with the development of collaborative relationships
between contractors and government agencies, this study focuses on partnerships developed by
local Head Start agencies in Ohio. Started in 1965 as part of the War on Poverty, Head Start
provides comprehensive child development programming to preschool children of low-income
families. The overall goal of this initiative is to improve school readiness among low-income
children. Head Start programs are located throughout the country and are supported by both federal
and state funding. In Ohio, local Head Start agencies have received state Head Start funding to
develop partnerships with local child care centers.

Data. This study uses data from the Partnership Impact Research Project.3 This is a threeround survey exploring early education partnerships between local Head Start agencies and child
care centers in Ohio. The survey was implemented in the spring and winter of 2002 and in the
summer of 2003. The surveys are longitudinal, but the same respondents were not necessarily
surveyed during every round. For our analysis, we have used three of the six data sets comprising
the Partnership Impact Research Project. They are as follows:
1. The Child Care Center Data Set contains information on nonprofit and for-profit child
care centers. The data is provided by the center directors and focuses on the population
served, services, funding sources, and other major characteristics of contractors. Some
child care centers included in this data set have a partnership with a local Head Start
provider in Ohio, while others do not.
2. The Child Care Center Partnership Data Set contains information on the child care
centers’ contracts with a local Head Start agency in Ohio and focuses on various aspects
of these contractual relationships. This partnership-level data set has information on a
subsample of the centers included in the Child Care Center Data Set mentioned above.
3. The Parent Data Set includes information collected from parents on the services their
children have received and their satisfaction with the service quality. This is parent-level
data, and thus it includes responses of several parents whose children attended the
centers included in the Child Care Center Data Set.
Each file represents pooled time-series data with up to three survey records for each child
care center (or each partnership). First, the Child Care Center Data and the Partnership Data were
merged using center ID numbers and wave indicators. At this point, the centers from the Child
Care Center Data that were not involved in a Head Start contract were dropped from our analysis.
We then modified the parent level data set listed above as No. 3. This data file was used to provide
information on parents’ assessments of center quality. Thus, using the Parent Data, we computed
an average parent-rated quality indicator for each center. Next, we merged this center-level
information with the first two data sets, resulting in 163 records. Finally, we used a variety of
strategies to deal with the observations with missing values for any of our independent and
dependent variables.4 The final data set which we used in this analysis contained 96 records, each
describing a nonprofit or a for-profit child care center and its partnership with a local Head Start
agency.
Employing the combined data set, we tested the proposed model using Ordinary Least
Squares regression to estimate the effects of individual independent variables on collaborative
relationship strength holding all the other independent and control variables constant. Due to the
structure of the data—an unbalanced panel data set with several observations for each child care
center—an individual child care center can appear multiple times in our data set, and the observations for these types of child care centers will not be independent of each other. To address
concerns about potential heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, we also tested the proposed
model using clustered robust standard errors.
Dependent variables. Appendices 1 and 2 provide information on how all variables are
operationalized and measured. For our dependent variable, we created a set of variables
measuring different aspects of collaborative relationship strength between a government agency
and a contractor perceived by the contractor. Specifically, the variable shared procedures reflects

the existence of procedures—not necessarily formally recorded—which govern the contractual
relationship and are acknowledged by both parties. These include the use of various processes to
explain the nature of the Head Start program to staff, to prepare staff for their responsibilities, to
ensure staff understands Head Start regulations, and to manage finances. This variable is the
mean of eight survey items measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (see Appendix A). The variable goal agreement reflects contractors’ perception regarding the extent to which both parties’
agree on contract goals. This is the mean of responses for four survey items indicated in
Appendix A. Among other things, this variable is intended to represent the extent to which there
is a shared philosophy or a vision of the curriculum and educational approaches. The variable
communication quality—the mean of three survey items listed in Appendix A—measures
whether or not the child care center directors believe they have good communication with their
public partners. More specifically, this variable reflects the contractors’ perception that their
voice is heard and that their input will be welcomed by the Head Start agency. Finally,
cooperation in contract implementation is the mean of five survey items describing cooperative
strategies used by the two parties involved in the contract. In particular, it reflects the
contractors’ perception of being “a full partner” and perceptions of being treated “with respect.”
We tested the reliability of the scales for these four variables using Cronbach alphas. The
resulting alpha scores range from .787 to .898, which exceed the minimum acceptable threshold.
We further conducted a confirmatory factor analysis of these four variables. The result indicates
that they can be combined into a single measure of collaborative relationship strength.5 We
created this aggregate measure by calculating the mean of the four variables described above.
Independent variables. The coding procedures for creating all independent variables are
explained in Appendix B. There are two independent variables that represent contract characteristics. The first variable is contract specificity. We computed the sum of eight dichotomous survey items to measure whether there is a written legal agreement and other formally recorded
documents detailing contract implementation procedures. The other independent variable that
represents a contract characteristic is relationship length. Some scholars have viewed relationship length and strength as essentially synonymous (Campbell & Harris, 1993; Macneil, 1974;
Smith, 1996; Smith & Smyth, 1996). However, we believe that contract length is distinct from its
strength—it is a separate factor that may or may not determine the strength. We measure relationship length as the number of years that a child care center has engaged in a partnership with a
particular local Head Start Agency in Ohio.
We operationalize contractor traits using several variables. We measure internal
management capacity reported by contractors themselves using the sum of seven survey items.
This variable is based on the number of times someone in a managerial position performed various
administrative functions such as “observing teachers in the classroom to assess their practice” and
“meeting with teachers to provide feedback regarding their teaching practices in the classroom.”
To reflect organizational ownership, we created two dummy variables: the first variable indicates
whether the organization is a nonprofit rather than a for-profit organization, and the second
variable indicates whether the contractor is a faith-based rather than a secular organization. Two
variables measure organizational size: average daily enrollment of preschoolers at a center and a
center’s total annual operating budget.
As a final contractor trait, we measure contractor service quality using three different
indicators. As our first measure of child care service quality, we include an objective measure of
agency performance in our data analysis. The Partnership Impact Research Project data set
includes data on the number of regulatory violations documented during the latest state licensing

inspection conducted by government quality inspectors. This is a negative measure of service
quality: lower values suggest better quality. In our sample, the values of this interval-ratio variable range from 0 to 49.
Similar to performance measures used in several recent studies (e.g., Brewer & Coleman,
2000; Chun & Rainey, 2005; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Selden & Sowa, 2004), our two other
measures of service quality are subjective. In the survey, respondents—child care center
directors—were first asked to provide detailed background information on various aspects of their
centers’ performance and then were asked to share their overall satisfaction with the quality of
their center. Specifically, the following survey question was used: “How satisfied are you with the
overall quality of your center?” There were five possible response categories: very satisfied (5),
somewhat satisfied (4), neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (3), not very satisfied (2), or not satisfied
at all (1). We also included a measure of child care center quality based on data collected from
parents. We created an ordinal variable based on the following question: “In general are you
satisfied with the quality of these services you get? (1 = not at all, 2 = not very, 3 = somewhat, 4
= very).” Parents were asked this question after discussing the specific services that their family
received. We computed an average center-level rating for this question using the parent-level data
for each center and included this in our center level analysis.
Due to their subjective nature, director and parent satisfaction with a child care center may vary
as much by the personality, education, and experience of the respondent as by the center’s actual
performance. This concern is minimized considerably for the parent-rated satisfaction measure
because it is an average based on data collected from multiple clients of each center. While our
subjective measures of service quality have their limitations, scholars agree that it is possible to
develop valid, reliable, and sensitive subjective measures of organizational performance (Brewer,
2006). An advantage of using employee and parent self-reports to measure performance in addition
to the data on “violations” is that the reports provide a global measure of performance and are able
to capture both output and outcome-based criteria (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005).
A contractor’s external ties to the environment are measured in three different ways. We
measure financial autonomy by the total number of funding sources received by an organization.
We summed the number of positive responses to the questions regarding whether a contractor
receives funding from eight different sources (federal Head Start, state Head Start, state preschool subsidies, parent tuition/fees, United Way funding, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s
Child and Adult Care Food Program, private foundation funding, and other funding). Having a
greater number of funding sources indicates that the contractor is more autonomous from the
local Head Start agency. In addition, we created a dichotomous variable referred to as affiliation
with a larger agency to indicate whether a center is part of a larger agency or an umbrella organization. Finally, we measure the influence of client groups using a dummy variable to indicate
whether a child care center provides opportunities for parents to participate in an advisory group.
Besides the independent variables, we include seven control variables in our model. To
measure teacher quality at each center, we use the proportion of teachers with a bachelor’s or
master’s degree. We also measure the supply of teachers in a child care center using the studentteacher ratio reported by each center. Furthermore, we include the percentage of each center’s
preschool teachers receiving training annually. To control the effect of geographical location, we
include a dichotomous variable indicating whether a contractor is located in a rural area. In
addition, we control for the characteristics of a center’s client population by including the
percentage of White preschoolers in our regression analysis. Finally, since the data set was
collected from three survey waves, we added two dummy variables indicating each survey wave.

Limitations. There are some limitations with this study’s data and research design. First,
the data describing the relationships between the government agencies and the contractors, our
dependent variables, were provided by the contractors rather than by the government agency or
both parties. Thus these variables reflect the contractors’ perceptions and are subjective.6 While
there is a possibility of a positive bias in the contractors’ reports, this bias is likely to be
systematic and should not compromise the analysis (Moynihan & Pandey, 2005). Another
limitation of this study is that the sample size for our analysis is 96 child care centers. As a
result, our models may have low statistical power. Finally, our data is based on child care
partnerships in a single state. This limits the generalizability of this study because of the multiple
factors that vary across states and are not captured in this analysis such as cost of living
differences and child care policies.7 Furthermore, we focus on a single service area with
outcomes that are difficult to measure. The findings of this analysis will therefore be more
applicable to similar social services such as elderly care where customers are typically unable to
judge quality and less generalizable to other types of services. Replications of this study in other
locations and service areas can help verify our findings.
Findings
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our variables both from the full data set with 163
observations as well as from the reduced data set with 96 observations after dropping those
records with missing values. We tested whether there is a statistically significant difference in
the means of the variables between the full sample and the reduced sample. The two-tailed test
results show that there is no statistically significant difference between sample means except for
parent-rated quality. In our reduced sample, 45 centers are nonprofit contractors (47%) and 12
centers are faith-based organizations (13%). The breakdown of the centers by wave is as follows:
37 centers appeared in Wave 1 (39%), 34 centers participated in Wave 2 (35%), and 25 centers
are included in Wave 3 (26%).
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variables
Dependent variables
Collaborative
relationship strength
Shared procedures
Goal agreement
Communication
quality
Cooperation in
contract
implementation
Independent variables
Contract characteristics
Contract specificity
Relationship length

N

M

SD

Min.

Max.

t statistic

158
96
158
96
158
96
158
96
158
96

3.667
3.700
3.187
3.200
3.878
3.922
3.789
3.844
3.815
3.835

0.832
0.900
0.946
1.002
0.919
0.966
0.970
1.010
0.981
1.051

1.400
1.400
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.400
1.400

5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000
5.000

-0.291

163
96
163
96

6.399
6.473
3.051
3.112

1.648
1.602
1.660
1.770

0.000
0.000
0.063
0.063

8.000
8.000
9.087
9.087

-0.355

163

29.808

31.744

0.000

185

-1.261

-0.102
-0.358
-0.427
-0.151

-0.274

Contractor traits

Internal management
capacity
Nonprofit
Faith-based
Contractor service quality
Director-rated
satisfaction
Parent-rated quality
Number of violations
Contractor size
Number of students
Contractor’s budget
(natural log)
Environmental conditions
Financial autonomy
from the contracting
agency
Affiliation with a
larger organization
Influence of client
groups
Control variables
Human resource capacity
Teacher quality
Teacher training
Student-teacher ratio
Contractor in rural area
% of White
preschoolers
Wave 2
Wave 3

96

35.392

35.883

3.900

185

163
96
163
96

0.466
0.469
0.172
0.125

0.500
0.502
0.378
0.332

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

-0.047

163
96
125

4.239
4.417
3.418

0.852
0.721
0.317

1.000
2.000
2.429

5.000
5.000
3.944

-1.792

96
131
96

3.203
8.298
7.729

0.493
8.213
8.095

2.000
0
0

5.000
49
49

163
96
163
96

32.938
32.989
12.704
12.718

18.816
17.234
0.738
0.824

6
7
8.006
8.006

135
100
15.654
15.654

-0.022

163

4.503

1.288

1.000

8.000

0.269

96

4.458

1.305

1.000

7.000

163
96
163
96

0.436
0.417
0.583
0.635

0.497
0.496
0.495
0.484

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

0.298

163
96
163
96
163
96
163
96
163
96
163
96
163
96

17.810
19.480
97.566
99.482
9.564
9.971
0.172
0.167
53.036
53.422
0.288
0.354
0.233
0.260

23.950
26.659
12.624
2.988
2.574
2.627
0.378
0.375
36.632
37.081
0.454
0.481
0.424
0.441

0.000
0.000
2.000
75.000
2.000
4.000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

100
100
100
100
15.000
15.000
1
1
100
100
1
1
1
1

-0.505

1.045

3.723

a

0.520

-0.137

-0.828

-1.852
-1.213
0.103
-0.081
-1.089
-0.483

a. p value = .0008.
We measure the strength of collaborative relationships using five measures as explained in
Appendix A. The mean scores of the four subdimensions of collaborative relationship strength in
our reduced data set range between 3.200 and 3.922, suggesting that childcare center directors
have relatively positive perceptions of their relationships with local Head Start agencies. In particular, goal agreement had the highest rated mean score and shared procedures had the lowest.
Communication quality and cooperation in contract implementation show similar levels of
strength: their mean scores are 3.844 and 3.835, respectively, which is considerably higher than
the mean score of shared procedures, 3.200. This result may suggest that the contractors and the

government agencies often agree on the vision, goals, and philosophy of child care provision and
have the capacity to effectively communicate and promote partnership-oriented behavior. However, developing specific, mutually understood procedures to ensure that everyone is involved in
the contract management may be less prevalent.
Applying the five different measures of the dependent variable, we tested the proposed
hypotheses. The first model utilizes our aggregate measure of collaborative relationship strength
as the dependent variable, while the remaining four models investigate the relative impact of
independent variables on the four specific dimensions of collaborative relationship strength: goal
agreement, communication quality, cooperation in contract implementation, and shared
procedures. Table 2 shows the estimation results for our OLS and clustered robust standard errors
models.8
Providing support for Hypothesis 1b, contract specificity is significant in all 10 regression
models. Contrary to the arguments by some scholars, the degree of formalization in contract
implementation is not negatively associated with the formation a good relationship between the
contractor and the government agency. Specification of contract parameters occurs in tandem
with the development of shared procedures, establishment of common goals, effective communication, and cooperation in contract implementation. Thus well-specified contracts and perhaps
the efforts devoted to developing them seem to foster strong collaborative relationships between
the contracting parties.9
Another important contract characteristic—relationship length—is positively associated
with cooperation in contract implementation in our clustered errors model. This finding suggests
that contractors are more likely to cooperate in the implementation of long-term contracts.
However, relationship length is not statistically significant in any of the other models, suggesting
that there is only limited support for Hypothesis 2.

Table 2. Regression Analysis Results for Collaborative Relationship Strength
Variables

Contract
characterist
ics
Contract
specificity
Relationship
length

Collaborative
relationship
strength
OLS
Clustere
(b)
d errors
(b)

0.194
***
0.095

Shared
procedures

Goal agreement

Communication
quality

OLS
(b)

Cluster
ed
errors
(b)

OLS
(b)

Cluste
red
errors
(b)

OLS
(b)

Cluster
ed
errors
(b)

0.194**

0.186*
0.136

0.191
**
0.001

0.191*

0.095

0.186*
*
0.136

0.234
***
0.096

0.234**
*
0.096

0.001

Cooperation in
contract
implementation
OLS (b) Clustere
d errors
(b)

0.163*

0.163*

0.148

0.148*

Contractor
traits
Internal
management
capacity
Nonprofit

Faith-based
Contractor
service
quality
Directorrated
satisfaction
Parent-rated
quality
Number of
violation
Contractor
size
Number of
students
Contractor’s
budget
Environment
al conditions
Financial
autonomy
Organization
al affiliation
Influence of
client groups
Control
variables
Human
resource
capacity
Teacher
quality
Teacher
training
Studentteacher ratio
Contractor in
rural area
% of White
preschoolers
Wave 2

0.002

0.002

0.006*

0.006*

0.000
2

0.0002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.851
**
0.200

-0.851*

1.058*

1.107
**
0.652

1.107*
*
0.652

0.191

-0.191

1.047**

1.047**

0.200

1.058*
*
0.102

0.423

-0.423

0.471

0.471

0.326
*

0.326*

0.296*

0.296

0.294
*

0.294*

0.379
*

0.379*

0.334*

0.334*

0.725
***
0.006

0.725***

0.798*

0.786
**
0.002

0.786*
*
0.002

0.690
**
0.007

0.690*

0.623*

0.623*

0.006

0.798*
*
0.007

0.007

0.006

0.006

0.001
0.019

-0.001

0.002

0.002

-0.008

-0.004

-0.004

-0.008

-0.008

0.001
0.008

-0.001

0.019

0.008
0.018

-0.008

0.072

0.072

0.317
***
0.811
**
0.222

0.317***

0.291*
*
0.812*

0.343**
*
0.262

0.378**
*
0.969**

0.028

0.028

0.255*
*
1.201*
*
-0.193

0.343
***
0.262

-0.222

0.255
**
1.201
***
0.193

0.378**

0.811*

0.291*
*
0.812*

0.272

-0.272

-0.451

-0.451

0.009
**
0.049

-0.009

-0.007

-0.007

0.012*

-0.008

-0.008

0.01

0.01

0.011
*
0.044

-0.011*

0.049**

0.012
**
0.064

0.044

0.079*

0.079**

0.034
0.301

-0.034

-0.036

-0.036

-0.019

-0.019

0.531

0.531

0.445

0.042
0.198

-0.042

0.301

0.037
0.445

0.198

0.032

0.032

0.005

0.005

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.004

0.008

0.008

0.005

0.005

0.031

-0.031

0.002

0.002

0.052

0.052

0.223

-0.223

0.048

0.048

0.102

0.007

0.018

0.064*
*
-0.037

0.969**

Wave 3

0.429

-0.429*

-0.516

0.516*

0.169

-0.169

Intercept

4.936
96
0.493
3.64*
**

-4.936*

-1.735

3.929

96
0.493
9.11***

96
0.436
2.90**
*

96
0.436
4.17**
*

6.184
96
0.442
2.98*
**

6.184*
96
0.442
4.35**
*

N
2
R
F-value

0.738
*
3.970
96
0.434
2.87*
**

-0.738*

-0.292

-0.292

-3.970

-7.853

-7.853*

96
0.434
4.35***

96
0.437
2.90***

96
0.437
5.78***

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
Two of the three environmental variables play an important role in explaining variation in
the dependent variables. Consistent with Hypothesis 8, financial autonomy is negatively associated
with relationship strength. This result confirms our hypothesis that contractors with diversified
funding streams have fewer incentives to invest their resources in developing strong collaborative
relationships with government agencies and is consistent with Amirkhanyan (2009). However,
these results should be interpreted cautiously. We measure financial autonomy using the number
of funding streams a contractor receives. Perhaps, a better measure of the concept, not available
for this research, would involve assessing the ratio of the contractor’s budget coming from Head
Start funding compared to the contractor’s total budget. The positive and significant association
between affiliation with a larger organization and collaborative relationship strength suggests the
importance of contractors’ external ties in contract implementation and confirms Hypothesis 9a.
Contractors affiliated with larger parent organizations develop stronger collaborative relationships
with government agencies. In particular, they establish more shared procedures, reach greater
agreement on contract goals, and have contracts that involve greater cooperation in their implementation. On the other hand, we fail to find support for Hypothesis 10 as our third environmental
variable, the presence of parent advisory groups, is not statistically significant.
Three contractor traits have signification associations with either our aggregate measure of
collaborative relationship strength or some of its submeasures. While a contractor’s internal
management capacity does not have a significant association with overall collaborative
relationship strength, it has a positive association with the development of shared procedures. This
result provides partial support for Hypothesis 3a and suggests that contractors whose leaders are
more skilled and active in internal managerial tasks are also more effective in detailing the
procedures to manage the contingencies of contract implementation in cooperation with their
public counterparts.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4b, nonprofit child care centers are less likely than their forprofit counterparts to develop strong collaborative relationships with local Head Start agencies.
Nonprofit status has a negative association with collaborative relationship strength when
collaborative relationship strength is measured by our aggregate measure, shared procedures,
goal agreement, and cooperation in contract implementation.
We also find partial support for Hypothesis 6. Service quality, as evaluated by parents
whose children attend the child care centers, has a positive relationship with every aspect of
collaborative relationship strength identified in this study. According to our OLS results, a oneunit increase in the average parent satisfaction with the child care center is associated with a .725
unit increase in the center’s overall collaborative relationship with the local Head Start agency. In
addition, another service quality measure based on data provided by child care center directors is
positively associated with all five aspects of collaborative relationship strength (except shared
procedures in our clustered errors model). Thus collaboration in contracting increases as client and

contractor satisfaction grows. However, we fail to find support for an association between the
number of licensing violations committed by the child care center and collaborative relationship
strength. It appears that trust between the contractor and government agency is sensitive to service
recipients’ satisfaction with the service as well as the contractor’s own confidence with the service
quality but is not associated with a more objective service quality measure, the frequency of
licensing violations.
We do not find any support for Hypothesis 5a, 5b, 7a, or 7b. Neither faith-based
ownership status nor contractor size is significantly associated with any of our measures of
collaborative relationship strength. In addition, most of the control variables included in the
regression analysis do not have significant associations with collaborative relationship strength.
One exception is teacher quality. The quality of teachers measured by the percentage of the
teachers who hold BA or MA degrees is negatively associated with some of our collaborative
relationship strength measures: aggregate collaborative relationship strength (in our ordinary
least squares [OLS] model only), goal agreement, and communication quality. We also find that
teacher training has a positive association with aggregate collaborative relationship strength (in
our clustered errors model only), goal agreement (in our clustered errors model only), and
cooperation in contract implementation.
Discussion
The objective of this article is to understand the factors associated with the development of
collaborative contracting relationships. We view the collaborative or “relational” aspects of
contract implementation broadly. Our conceptualization includes joint efforts and practices to
ensure that the contractor shares the same vision and philosophy as the government, has a voice
and feels respected in the implementation process, and understands all the expectations,
regulations, and procedures. The primary finding of this study is that the development of detailed
contracts and collaborative contracting arrangements play a complementary role in contracting
relationships, rather than having a negative association, as it was often suggested in the past. Our
research indicates that collaborative contracting arrangements are often used in tandem with legal
agreements and documents that formally prescribe contractor roles, responsibilities, procedures,
and actions. Thus what has been viewed as a dichotomy may, in fact, represent two important and
parallel practices in contract management.
These results challenge the assertions by some scholars that trust is associated with less
formal contract specification (Gulati, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). We find that as contract
specification increases, contracting relationships actually become stronger as measured by goal
agreement, communication quality, cooperation in contract implementation, and the development
of shared contracting procedures. If this is the case, there may be greater transaction costs
associated with the contract specification process when strong collaborative relationships
develop between the government and contractor rather than fewer costs. At the same time, strong
collaborative relationships may still be associated with fewer transaction costs during the contract implementation process as a result of greater alignment regarding service delivery goals and
expectations. Our results shed light on the process of developing strong interorganizational relationships: they suggest that contract specification may serve as a necessary foundation on which
actual relationships are built and improved. Hence, while contract specification requires capacity
and effort, this investment appears to have a positive effect on the more intangible aspects of
relationships: understanding, shared values, and respect.

We find limited evidence that relationship length is positively associated with the development of collaborative contracting relationships. There is some evidence indicating contractors are
more likely to cooperate in a contract’s implementation as the length of the contract increases.
This result is generally consistent with past research, which suggests that trust develops over time
(Thomson & Perry, 2006; Van Slyke, 2007, 2009).
Our findings are particularly interesting in the light of earlier research on the effect of time
in contracting relationships. A recent article by Yang, Tzung, and Hsieh (2009) explores the effect
of different government capacity measures on various performance indicators. They observe that
the impact of some of these capacities is moderated by the passage of time. For instance, the
positive effect that agenda-setting and evaluation capacities have on performance declines with
time, while the benefits of implementation capacity actually grow over time. If we view our
dependent variables, broadly, as indicators of “collaborative capacity” in government contracts—
something that may eventually help improve the contractors’ performance—our study may contribute to this discussion. Rather than exploring how time can moderate the effect of some
governments’ capacities on performance, our study helps understand whether these capacities
grow or decline over time. In fact, we find that time matters for whether subjects believe they are
respected, they are full partners, and their partnerships are fully established (our measures of
cooperation in contract implementation). Thus time helps build child care center directors’ emotional comfort and the feeling of being trusted and respected in these relationships. Time, however,
did not contribute to the other aspects of collaborative capacity: goal agreement, communication
quality, and share procedures. Our findings confirm the conclusion of Yang and colleagues (2009)
that contract managers and researchers should adopt a long-term perspective on government
contracting and expect some capacities to be more prevalent and more important for performance
in the course of contract implementation.
Another important finding of our study is that parents’ and child care center directors’
satisfaction with service quality is associated with stronger collaborative contracting
relationships.10 This may suggest that contractors that are effective in their core activities
establish closer partnerships with their monitoring agency. Thus past organizational performance
may be an important clue for public officials involved in the contractor selection process. On the
other hand, we do not find a significant association between our third measure of service quality,
the frequency of licensing violations, and any of our measures for strong collaborative
relationships. Perhaps, the nature of these violations may explain these findings. The number of
licensing violations in our regressions measures child care centers’ compliance with health and
safety regulations. Some of these violations may be determined by the condition of the facility,
equipment, or other similar factors. Such problems may arise irrespective of the partnership
strength and, in and of themselves, may not have an effect on relationships. In cooperative
relationships, we would expect these problems to be resolved in the spirit of full partnership by
openly acknowledging them and establishing a plan of action. In less cooperative relationships,
more formal compliance-based tools may have to be used. Our findings suggest that regulatory
performance problems not only do not bring partners closer together but also do not draw them
apart. In addition, as is frequently the case with objective measures of performance, the number
of licensing violations may simply not be comprehensive enough to capture important
dimensions of child care center performance (Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006).
In addition, we find that a contractor’s internal management capacity is associated with the
development of shared procedures in contracting relationships. Some child care center directors in
the sample were active in observing their teachers in the classroom, providing feedback, discussing

how the curriculum satisfies the developmental needs of children, and reviewing program data to
make improvements and track the attainment of organizational objectives. Regression analysis
suggests that these directors were also more likely to work on building strong collaborative
relationships with government agencies. Specifically, they were more likely to work on developing
procedures to ensure that staff has a good understanding of Head Start, there are processes for
resolving conflicts, and staff is involved in all phases of the partnerships. Our findings suggest that
the same organizational managers who work effectively within their organizations tend to work
effectively across organizational boundaries.
Our study also indicates that nonprofit organizations are less likely to maintain collaborative
relationships with government agencies. We suggest two possible explanations. First despite the
many virtues ascribed to nonprofit organizations, public managers may be increasingly aware of
their problems including financial abuses and unethical behavior (Arenson, 1995; Grimaldi &
Trescott, 2008; Reaves, 2001), the lack of management capacity and the absence of factors to
“discipline” dysfunctional managers in small noncompetitive markets (Hansmann, 1986; Johnston
& Romzek, 1999; Prager, 1994; Rose-Ackerman, 1986), nonprofits’ ability to apply political
pressures on local governments for increased service rates (Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Smith &
Smyth, 1996), and, in some subsectors, nonprofits’ propensity to limit their service to the more
affluent clients (Amirkhanyan et al., 2008). Furthermore, a recent study analyzed contract
monitoring practices across nonprofit and for-profit contractors (Amirkhanyan, 2010). This study
found that while public managers consider contractors’ ownership status unimportant in their
work, managers working with nonprofit contractors in fact used a different set of performance
measures, and some respondents reported being especially cautious of the vendors’ nonprofit
status. These factors may explain the lower levels of collaborative relationship strength with
nonprofit organizations in our study.
A second plausible explanation is that the data on collaborative relationships we used
were obtained from the vendors. Thus we find that nonprofit organizations perceive their
partnerships with the government to be less collaborative than their for-profit counterparts. This
may reflect higher expectations of and a propensity toward collaborative activity by the nonprofit
providers. The for-profit organizations may be more likely to view their contracts with
government agencies as business transactions and not expect to share service delivery
philosophies, or be seen as a “full partners” in the relationship.
While we find that contractor size by itself does not matter, financial and organizational
autonomy have a significant impact on the development of strong collaborative relationships. In
our study, contractor affiliation with a larger institution is positively associated with collaborative
relationship strength. Our results also indicate that contractors with fewer funding sources have
stronger collaborative relationships with their public partners. Our data preclude us from knowing
how the private contractors were formed, which may have helped in the interpretation of this
finding. In fact, some contractors could have been formed (or significantly expanded) in response
to a specific contract opportunity. Being “the creatures” of government action in the past, these
organizations would have stronger informal ties at the onset of the contract and can be expected to
invest more time and effort as the relationship progresses. In such cases, it is also reasonable to
expect some level of staff transitions across sectors (e.g., cases of government managers
transitioning from the public sector to the private sector but still maintaining strong ties with the
public agency). On the other hand, the contractors with multiple sources of funding are less likely
to have an inherent link to a specific government agency and are therefore more likely to be
independent.

Our findings on financial and organizational autonomy have important implications for
contractor selection. They suggest that public managers should carefully consider a contractor’s
other partnerships when selecting a vendor and strategically evaluate how important the contract
is for a specific contractor. In addition, a contractor’s other partnerships should be considered at
the contract implementation stage. Public managers who place a high value on establishing collaborative contracting relationships should recognize that they may need to spend more time and
effort building partnerships with contractors that are not affiliated with larger umbrella organizations and with contractors that are more financially autonomous.
One important limitation of our analysis suggests a fruitful direction for the future research.
Our data allow us to observe the end result rather than the process of developing strong collaborative or highly formalized relationships. Thus we do not know if more specific contracts were
developed jointly or if the Head Start agencies unilaterally set the standards and the processes for
the contractors, which eventually improved the contractors’ relationships with their agencies. For
instance, we know that some contracts involved “a document that describe[d] procedures for
communication,” but we do not know if the document was developed jointly. Past research
suggests that some contractors negotiate the rules, regulations, and standards at different points in
the course of contracting, while other contractors accept the standards unilaterally developed by
the government agency (Amirkhanyan, 2009). Understanding these “process-related” aspects of
contracts can have important implications for the practice of contract management.
This study provides insights into the organizational and environmental factors associated
with stronger collaborative relationships between governments and their contractors. Contract
management and implementation, however, is a complex process. Aside from the quality of
contractual relationships, numerous factors may be associated with programmatic outcomes.
Such factors include the contractors’ service delivery and management capacity, sufficient
resources, characteristics of the client population, market conditions, quality of performance
measurement procedures and data, and many others. The ultimate task—pursued by the authors
of this research in a follow-up study—is therefore to disentangle the association of relationship
design and other factors with organizational performance. Our data set has several interesting
and distinct measures of performance that make it possible to separate performance from
relationships by utilizing the assessments of multiple independent constituencies. If this future
study finds relationships indeed matter, the findings of this current study may provide
practitioners with valuable information on the factors that influence their development.
Appendix A
Survey Items for Dependent Variables
Variable
Collaborative relationship
strength (aggregate)

Shared procedures

Items used to create each variable
Mean of four variables created below: “shared
procedures,” “goal agreement,” “communication
quality,” and “cooperation in contract
implementation”
Mean of the following survey items measured on a
5-point Likert-type scale
(1 = not at all, 2 = not very, 3 = neither satisfied nor
dissatisfied, 4 = somewhat,5 = very much so)

Cronbach α = .898

Goal agreement
Cronbach α = .874

Communication quality
Cronbach α = .787

Cooperation in contract
implementation
Cronbach α = .825

The partnership between my child care center and
Head Start has . . .
1. Process for ensuring child care staff have a good
understanding of Head Start
2. Process to ensure staff understand Head Start
regulations
3. Procedures for resolving conflicts or differences
across your Programs
4. Ensured that child care staff are prepared for their
new responsibilities
5. Ensured that all staff are involved in all phases of
partnerships
6. Procedures to keep children in the program if their
parents lose eligibility for child care subsidy
7. Procedures to keep children in the program if their
parents lose eligibility for Head Start services
Procedures to manage finances as part of the
partnership
Mean of the following survey items measured on a
5-point Likert-type scale
1. The partnership between my child care center and
Head Start has a shared partnership philosophy and
vision
2. The partnership between my child care center and
Head Start has agreement about
curriculum/educational approach
3. The partnership between my child care center and
Head Start has agreements or plans that help guide
the partnership work
4. My center and Head Start have similar goals for
our work together
Mean of the following survey items measured on a
5-point Likert-type scale
1. The partnership between my child care center and
Head Start has good communication within and
across your organizations
2. I feel my voice is heard in the Partnership
3. I feel I can pick up the phone and call the Head
Start program
Mean of the following survey items measured on a
5-point Likert-type scale
1. Individuals involved in the partnership between
my child care center and Head Start demonstrate
mutual respect for one another
2. I feel my program is a full partner with the Head
Start program

3. I feel the Head Start program respects my
Program
4. I feel Head Start does not really view my center as
a partner (reverse coding)
5. How would you characterize your partnership
with Head Start on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = just
forming and 5 = fully established
Appendix B
Survey Items for Independent Variables
Variable
Items used to create each variable
Contract characteristics
Contract specificity
Sum of the following survey items measured as
dichotomous nominal variables:
1. Currently do you have a written legal agreement or a
contract with Head Start?
2. Do you regularly update the document?
3. Does this agreement specify the maximum number of
children who can receive Head Start enhanced services
at your center?
4. In your partnership with Head Start, do you have a
written document that describes roles and
responsibilities of Head Start and of people at your
center in providing services?
5. Do you have any documents that describe the
partnership’s goals and specific actions that the
partnership plans to take to achieve the goals?
6. In your partnership, do you have any written
documents that state what your program needs to do to
meet Head Start Program Performance Standards?
7. Do you have documents describing procedures for
communicating with your Head Start partner?
8. Do you have a well-defined process for recruiting and
enrolling children into your center for Head Start
enhanced services?
Relationship length
Number of years that the center has engaged in the
partnership
Contractor traits
Internal management capacity
Sum of seven dichotomous survey items:
Please indicate the average number of times someone in
an administrative role at your center, such as an
education coordinator, administrator, or senior teacher,
engages in the following activities during a typical
month.
1. Observes teachers in the classroom to assess their
practice.

Nonprofit contractor

Faith-based contractor
Contractor service quality
Director’s satisfaction

Parent-rated satisfaction

Number of violations
Contractor size
Number of students
Contractor’s budget
Environmental conditions
Financial autonomy from the
contracting agency

2. Meets with teachers to provide feedback regarding
their teaching practices in the classroom.
3. Meets with teachers to discuss how to link the
curriculum to children’s developmental needs.
4. Discusses with teachers strategies to ensure teaching
practice is developmentally appropriate.
5. Discusses with teachers strategies to ensure a literacyrich curriculum.
6. Reviews teachers’ teaching.
7. Reviews program data to see how the center is doing
compared to specific goals or objectives.
Is your center a nonprofit or for-profit organization?
(coded as 1 for nonprofit organizations and 0 for forprofit organizations)
Is your center a faith-based organization? (coded as 1 for
positive answers)
“How satisfied are you with the overall quality of your
center?”1 = not satisfied at all, 2 = not very satisfied, 3
= neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 4 = somewhat
satisfied, 5 = very satisfied
Mean score of parents’ responses from one center to the
following question, “In general, are you satisfied with
the quality of these services you get?” (1 = not at all, 2
= not very, 3 = somewhat,4 = very)
Number of violations documented during state licensing
inspections
What is the average daily enrollment of preschoolers?
(numeric)
What is your child care center’s current total annual
operating budget? (numeric)
Total number of funding streams
Does your center or agency access the following funding
sources to provide services to preschoolers and their
families at your child care center? (1 = yes, 0 = no)
1. Federal Head Start
2. State Head Start
3. State Preschool Subsidies
4. Parent tuition/fees
5. United Way funding
6. USDA CACFP
7. Private foundation funding
8. Other funding

Affiliation with a larger organization
Influence of client groups

Is your center part of a larger agency or umbrella
organization? (coded as 1 for positive answers)
Does your center provide opportunities for parents to
participate in an advisory group? (coded as 1 for
positive answers)

Control variables
Human resource capacity
Teacher quality

Percentage of teachers with a Bachelor’s degree or a
Master’s degree
Teacher training
Percentage of teachers receiving training annually
Student-teacher ratio
What is the ratio of preschoolers to teachers or teaching
aides at your center?
Contractor in the rural area
Survey item “urbanicity” (1 = urban, 2 = suburban, 3 =
small town,4 = rural; coded as 1 for small towns and
rural areas and 0 for other responses)
% of White Preschoolers
Percentage of white preschoolers served by a center
Wave 2
Survey wave 2 (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Wave 3
Survey wave 3 (0 = no, 1 = yes)
Note: USDA CACFP = United States Department of Agriculture Child and Adult Care Food
Program.
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Notes
1. Asset specificity refers to the extent to which the physical infrastructure, technology, and
knowledge and skills needed to produce a particular service can be used in the production
of other services.
2. In addition to trust, contract specification is likely to be related to a variety of other
factors including the complexity of the contracted service.
3. . The formal title of the data set is ICPSR04298-v1, 2001-2004.
4. There were less than five missing cases in any of the relational design variables, and we
imputed means (the means and the medians had similar values). The variable measuring
the number of violations had32 missing cases, and since this number is substantial we
removed all missing cases from our analysis. The variable measuring directors’
satisfaction with the center had only one missing case, and we imputed the mode to retain
that case in our analysis. The proportion of missing cases among control variables was
well below 5%, and we imputed average or mode values.

5. We conducted a factor analysis to confirm the measurement model for collaborative
relationship strength using the principal component analysis method. Varimax rotation
method was applied. Following the Kaiser criterion, we dropped the components with
eigenvalues under one (Dunteman, 1989). According to the resulting correlation matrix,
there is only one component with eigenvalue greater than one. Those dropped
components’ eigenvalues range from 0.258 to 0.392. This result confirms that the four
measures of collaborative relationship strength validate the single factor structure. The
produced factor loadings for the four measured variables are “shared procedures” (0.844),
“goal agreement” (0.886), “communication quality” (0.881), and “cooperation in contract
implementation” (0.878).
6. It would be ideal if the relationship strength variables reflected both the contractors and
the Head Start agency perspectives. The Partnership Impact Research Project does
include the Head Start Partner Survey that measured Head Start directors’ perspectives on
their partnerships with contractors. However, matching the responses from the center
directors with the responses from the Head Start directors caused a significant loss of
data. For the sake of the statistical power of our data set, we decided not to use the Head
Start Partner Survey data for this study.
7. Nonetheless, focusing on one state does help us keep constant the state-level variation in
such policies, which may reduce concerns regarding spuriousness.
8. Due to potential reverse causality issues with many of our independent variables, we
discuss our findings in terms of correlation rather than causation.
9. As a sensitivity analysis, we ran a model exploring whether a reciprocal relationship
exists between contract specification and relationship strength. The results of this
sensitivity analysis are generally consistent with the estimation results presented in this
article.
10. We have conducted a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis by using human resource
capacity variables (teacher quality, teacher training, and student-teacher ratio) as
instruments for parent-rated service quality. We find that contract specificity and
affiliation with a larger organization are still significant, but most other variables lose
their significance. We also tested a model where we use the same instruments for
director-rated service quality. The results show that contract specificity and nonprofit
status are still significant.
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